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THE CALM AFTER THE STORM:
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
IN THE 'SUPREME COURT'S 2000-2001 TERM
Joel Gora'
INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to be here again. As compared to last
term, the term that we are commenting on now was a good one
-2for the First Amendment. A year ago First Amendment
claimants tended to lose their cases in the Supreme Court.' This
past year, however, claimants prevailed six out of eight times.
In addition, the kinds of liberal/conservative schisms that have
been seen in some of the employment cases were less prevalent in
the First Amendment cases.5  In fact, there tended to be a
switching of sides. There were some cases where the First
Amendment claim was accepted by the liberal justices, and
rejected by the conservative justices, and 'others where the reverse
was true. If you look at the overall pattern, there has been a sea
of change in the past generation on who is in favor of the First
Amendment.
1. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law- School; B.A., Pomona College;
LL.B., Columbia University School of Law. I would like to express my
appreciation to Nicole Kaplan, Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003, for her
outstanding work on this article.
2 U.S. CONST. amend'I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.,.
,3 See Los Angeles Police Dept. v,; United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S.
32 (1999); Nixon v..Shrink-Missouri Gov't. PAC,' 528 U.S. 377 (2000); and
Hill v.' Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
4 See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531, U.S. 533 (2001); Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); U.S. v.: United Foods, Inc., 531 U.S. 405
(2001); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 531 U.S. 525 (2001); and Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S.
510 (2001).
5 See e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 530 U.S. 105 (2001).
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A generation ago, the First Amendment stalwarts were the
liberals on the Court, epitomized by Justices Hugo L. Black and
William 0. Douglas. They generally tended to be very skeptical
of government efforts to restrict free speech and freedom of the
press.6 Nowadays, liberals can be found on the government side
of the claims, not uniformly or routinely, but enough at least to
raise some eyebrows. If you look at the this past term, in the
eight cases noted, the justices who ruled for the First Amendment
most frequently were the conservative justices; with Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy ruling that way seven out of eight times.7
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justices Clarence
Thomas and Antonin Scalia, ruled in favor of the First
Amendment five out of eight times.8 The Justice who ruled in
favor of the First Amendment claim least often was Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, who upheld the First Amendment claim only
three out of the eight cases. 9 It is interesting to note where some
of these cases fit into that change in direction. Liberal justices
are often willing to accommodate the government's claim as to
why speech needs to be restricted just as often as their
conservative counterparts were a generation ago.
The cases that will be discussed have been grouped
according to themes. The winning cases will be addressed first,
followed by the two cases where the First Amendment claim was
rejected. The first three cases where the First Amendment claim
prevailed are United States v. United Foods, Inc.,' ° Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly" and Bartnicki v. Vopper.12 These cases
dealt with instances where the Court was concerned with
6 See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
' In Lorillard Tobacco, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate opinion concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 571.
s See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 405; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98;
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 525 2404; Cook, 531 U.S. at 510; FEC v.
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
9 See Legal Services, 531 U.S. at 533; Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514; Cook, 531
U.S. at 510.
10 531 U.S. 533.
" 531 U.S. 98.
12 532 U.S. 514.
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commercial speech or with the flow of information to the
public. 13 The second three cases where the First Amendment
claim also prevailed are Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez, 14 the Good News Club case 15 and Cook v. Gralike.
16
The common theme in these cases is that the Court was
concerned that the government was either discriminating against
points of view it disagreed with, or the government was basically
trying to affect the outcome of the debate, or put its thumb on the
scale of the debate. 17 The final two cases are the two cases where
First Amendment claimants lost. One involved prisoners in Shaw
v. Murphy18 and one involved politicians in Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee. 19
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH & PRIVATE SPEECH THAT IS A
MAITER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
The first case I want to discuss is United States v. United
States Foods Corporation.20 This is not so much a right to speak
case as it is a right not to speak case. The Court has long
interpreted the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech
as including a cognate protection of freedom from speech.21 In
the famous old World War II case, West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court struck down compulsory flag
saluting on the ground that making young children salute the flag
violates their conscience. The Court held that compulsory flag
saluting is a form of compulsory speech, which violated the first
13 See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 405; Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 525;
and Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514.
14 Legal Services, 531 U.S. at 533.
'5 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98.
16 Cook, 531 U.S. at 510.
17 See, e.g., Legal Services, 531 U.S. at 542.
's 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
'9 533 U.S. 431.
20 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 405.
21 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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Amendment rights of the children involved.22 The Court has
stuck with that doctrine in a number of settings, including not
only personal conscience refusals to speak, but also refusals to
speak in commercial or institutional settings. 23 That is what this
case involved.
United Foods is a large agricultural company, which,
because of a federal statute, the Mushroom Promotion Research
and Consumer Information Act,24 was required to contribute
funds to support generic advertising of mushrooms.25 Although
we have not seen many mushroom ads, we have seen the milk ads
with the mustache, and the beef ads. These types of ads
represent the sort of generic industry advertising often required
by government standards, and the component members of the
industry are expected to contribute funds to pay for this
advertising. United Foods did not want to contribute money for
generic mushroom ads. United Foods felt that the generic
advertising detracted from its own wonderful product, which was
not your average mushroom. Rather than contributing to
advertisements for the industry, United Foods wanted to use their
funds to support their own advertisements for mushrooms.26
They claimed the government Act required them to subsidize
speech that they disagreed with and did not want to subscribe to,
and this requirement violated their First Amendment rights.27
The fact that the speech in issue was commercial speech
led to some suggestion in the arguments that commercial
enterprises should not have a right not to speak. The argument
was that the government is regulating business when it regulates
commercial speech, and therefore the government should have a
greater opportunity to control and dictate the terms of business,
including advertising.28 Indeed, a few years earlier in a case
22 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
23 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
24 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6112 (1990).
25 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 408.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 409.
28 Id. at 2339.
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called Glickman v. Wileman Brothers,29 the Court upheld a
seemingly similar program which required producers in the fruit
tree industry to contribute funds for generic advertising.3 ° In
Glickman, the Court rejected a claim that the government
improperly compelled commercial speech under the First
Amendment. However, in the mushroom case the Court accepted
that claim,3 1 reasoning that unlike the fruit tree industry, which
was highly regulated by the government and where the
advertising features were part of that heavy regulation, the
mushroom industry did not have the same kind of systemic
regulation. As a result, this requirement was basically only about
requiring members of this industry to produce funds to subsidize
the message that the government thought ought to be subsidized.32
Therefore the Court held that the requirement that speech the
speaker disagrees with be subsidized was impermissible under the
First Amendment.33 It violated the right not to speak.
In reaching its conclusion, and distinguishing this case
from the earlier Glickman case, the Court noted that, for
example, in states where lawyers can be required to be members
of a unified bar and have to pay dues to that bar, they can only be
required to pay dues that directly support regulation of the
practice, and not dues that support the bar's lobbying on public
issues.34 The Court said the same is true of members of labor
unions, and the same for commercial speakers and corporations
like United Foods.35
United Foods was a six-to-three decision in which Justice
Kennedy, the Court's most vigorous First Amendment champion,
wrote the opinion. The dissenters, Justice Steven G. Breyer and
Justice Ginsburg, took the position that this was regulation of
business, it was not regulation of speech. Indeed, this regulation
29 Glickman v. Wileman Brothers, 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
30 Id. at 477.
"' United Foods, 533 U.S. at 417.32Id. at 412.
33 /d. at 413.
4 Id. at 414.
" Id. at 427.
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was regulation of the funding of speech.36 According to the
dissenters' point of view, the government had more leeway and
more justification in regulating the funding of speech. This was a
point of view that would prevail in the campaign finance case, 37
which will be discussed later. However, in this case the majority
recognized that the right not to speak is available to commercial
speakers. It is not just available to people who are compelled to
utter words they may not want to. The right not to speak is also
available to people in organizations that are compelled to
subsidize and pay for the messages they chose not to support.38
This was the first victory for the First Amendment.
Another victory was won for commercial speakers in the
case of Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly.39 This was a long-awaited
test case about the extent to which state and local government can
regulate the sale, advertising and promotion of tobacco
products. 40  The case dealt with a Massachusetts statute that
regulated the marketing and advertising, including billboards and
point-of-sale activities, of tobacco products .41 The tobacco
industry representatives challenged the regulations on a number
of grounds. The first argument that the tobacco representatives
made was a preemption argument. In passing the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,42 Congress essentially
stated that states are barred from restricting advertising or
promotion of cigarettes based on smoking and health concerns.
Any regulation of advertising of tobacco products based on
smoking and health concerns is limited to federal regulation. 43 In
other words, states are preempted from enacting regulation where
cigarettes are concerned. 44 A majority of the Court, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, accepted that argument and said
36 Id. at 2347 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37 FEC, 533 U.S. at 431.
31 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415.
39 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 525.
40 Id. at 532.
4' MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09 (2000).
42 15 U.S.C.S. § 1331 et seq.43 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541.
4Id. at 543.
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there was clear congressional intent to preempt regulation of the
advertising of cigarettes.
45
The government argued that the restrictions were billboard
placement restrictions that precluded the billboard advertisement
of cigarettes within a thousand feet of a school or a playground or
other similar sensitive locations.46 Moreover, the government
argued this was not really regulation of the content of the
advertising; it was a regulation of the manner or location of the
advertising and therefore was not preempted.47 In rejecting this
argument, the Court said there is a preemption of anything having
to do with the advertising of cigarettes, whether it is the content
or the method of advertising. 48  Thus, those parts of the local
statute were displaced on a preemption theory and could not be
enforced. 49 However, this still left other parts of the statute that
regulated matters that were not preempted. Two matters were
significant. The first was advertising of any kind having to do
with tobacco products other than cigarettes, including cigars and
smokeless tobacco. The second was the regulation of the sale of
tobacco products.
The Massachusetts statute included some severe
regulations regarding the sale of tobacco products .50 This is
where the Court had to address the First Amendment and where it
45 Id. at 542. ("In the preemption provision, Congress unequivocally
precluded the requirement of any additional statements on cigarette packages
beyond those provided in § 1333. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Congress further
precludes States or localities from imposing any requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health with respect to the advertising and promotion of
cigarettes. § 1334(b).")
46 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 21.04(5)(a) (2000):
Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed
stadiums and advertising from within a retail establishment
that is directed toward or visible from the outside of the
establishment, in any location that is within a 1,000 foot
radius of any public playground, playground area in a public
park, elementary school or secondary school.
41 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 550.
48 Id. at 551.
49 id.
50 See, MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09 (2000).
See also, Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 562-63.
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engaged in a generic First Amendment analysis. The Court had
to decide how a 1,000-foot limitation on the placement of
advertising for smokeless tobacco and cigars should be addressed
by the Court under the First Amendment. 5 1  Some observers
thought that this would be an occasion where the majority of the
Court might show a certain restlessness toward its test or formula
for judging commercial speech issues; the so-called Central
Hudson case formula.52 Some thought the Court might be willing
to revisit Central Hudson and grant greater protection for
commercial speech than the Central Hudson balancing formula
gives. However, that was not the case. Rather than using this
case as an occasion to revisit and revise the Central Hudson test,
the Court applied the Central Hudson test. 3 The four element
test is: 1) whether the lawful activities are advertised in a non-
misleading way; 2) whether the government interest is
substantial; 3) whether the regulation advances the government's
interest; and 4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than
necessary to advance that government interest. 4 In addressing
first the '1,000-foot rule,' the Court said the first three elements
of the test were met. The court held that the regulation directly
advanced the government's interest in trying to reduce smoking,
especially by children.55 However, the Court said the fourth part
"' Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 562.
52 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566; See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 555-56.
" Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
54 Id.
55 Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 556.
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of the test, that regulation be no more extensive than necessary to
advance the government interest, was not satisfied here. 6
According to the Court, the ban in this case was almost a
total ban on outdoor advertising because if you put all of the
thousand-foot zones together, the statistics showed that almost 90
percent of the area in most major cities in the state of
Massachusetts would be advertising-free zones.57 The Court
believed this was not a carefully tailored approach because it
amounted to almost a total ban of advertising in major
metropolitan areas which was not justified by the important
interest in preventing children from smoking or in discouraging
adult smoking. 58 Applying a traditional application of the Central
Hudson balancing formula for commercial speech restrictions, the
majority held that the restriction was impermissible,59
In terms of point-of-sale advertising requirements, the
Court also believed there was a careless balancing of the interests
56 Id. at 565.
57 Id. at 562. The Court went on to state:
In the District Court, petitioners maintained that this
prohibition would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of
Boston, Worchester, and Springfield, Massachusetts. 84 F.
Supp. 2d at 191. The 87 % to 91% figure appears to include
not only the effect of the regulations, but also the limitations
imposed by other generally applicable zoning
restrictions.. .[t]he [Mass.] Attorney General disputed
petitioners' figures but "conceded that the reach of the
regulations is substantial." 218 F.3d at 50. Thus, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the regulations prohibit advertising
in a substantial portion of the major metropolitan areas of
Massachusetts.
58 Id. The Court went on to state:
In some geographical areas, these regulations would
constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of
truthful information about smokeless tobacco and cigars to
adult consumers. The breadth and scope of the regulations,
and the process by which the [Mass.] Attorney General
adopted the regulations, do not demonstrate a careful
calculation of the speech interests involved.
See also Id. at 2426 ("The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical
limitation demonstrates a lack of tailoring.")
59Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 565.
2001
TOURO LAWREVIEW
regarding restrictions on where cigarette advertisements could be
placed in the cigarette store. 60 According to the Court, once the
customer is in the store, the storeowner is dealing with people
who want to be there. Therefore, there is less justification to try
to protect children and others in that setting.6 1
The one part of the statute that the Court upheld was the
section that regulated the actual marketing of the cigarettes.62
The statute provided for a ban on cigarette displays that enabled a
customer to simply reach in and grab a pack and say, "I want
these" .63 The concern was that children could more easily reach
those cigarettes in a candy store. 64  It appears the ban was
intended for vending machines because sales of cigarettes in
stores were required to be conducted by attendant personnel, and
vending machines were the exact opposite. The Court upheld
6 Id. at 566. ("We conclude that the point-of-sale advertising regulations
fail both the third and fourth steps of the Central Hudson analysis.")
61 Id. ("Advertising cannot be 'placed lower than five feet from the floor of
any retail establishment which is located within a one thousand foot radius of'
any school or playground. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(5)(b),
22.06(5)(b) (2000)."); The Court went on to state:
[T]he State's goal is to prevent minors from using tobacco
products and to curb demand for that activity by limiting
youth exposure to advertising. The 5 foot rule does not seem
to advance that goal. Not all children are less than 5 feet
tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up
and take in their surroundings.
62 Id. at 570. The Court stated:
We conclude that the sales practices regulations withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. The means chosen by the State
are narrowly tailored to prevent access to tobacco products
by minors, are unrelated to expression, and leave open
alternative avenues for vendors to convey information about
products and for would-be customers to inspect products
before purchase.
63 Id. at 576. (" [T]he regulations bar the use of self-displays and require that
tobacco products be placed out of the reach of all consumers in a location
accessible only to salespersons. MASS. REGS. CODE tit 940 §§ 21.04(2)(c)-
(d), 22.06(2)(c)-(d) (2000).")
6Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 570. ("Unattended displays of tobacco
products present an opportunity for access without the proper age verification
required by law.")
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those restrictions on the ground that they were not about speech;
they were about business and required no First Amendment
justification in order to permit them.65 Therefore, advertising
restrictions on cigarettes and advertising restrictions on other
tobacco products were eradicated by the preemption rule and the
First Amendment analysis respectively. However, "non-speech"
was involved in the restrictions on the sale of tobacco, and those
restrictions were upheld. 66
There are one or two points to be commented on
regarding the other opinions. Justice Thomas, along with Justice
Kennedy, has turned out, in many instances, to be quite a
vigorous proponent and supporter of free speech, particularly
commercial speech. He takes the position that as long as the
advertising is for a lawful product and it is not false or
misleading, commercial speech should be judged by the same
First Amendment standards as any other kind of speech.67 If the
advertising is lawful and not fraudulent, the Court should not
engage in any of these diluted balancing tests. According to
Justice Thomas, commercial speech should be assimilated into the
First Amendment family, not treated as a stepchild, and provided
it with full First Amendment protection. .68
65 Id. at 566. ("The Court of Appeals recognized that self-service displays
'often do have some communicative commercial function,' but noted that the
restriction in the regulations 'is not on speech, but rather on the physical
location of actual tobacco products.' citing 218 F.3d at 53.")
6 Id. at 570-71.
67 Id. at 572. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("[W]hen the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress
the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in
question may be characterized as 'commercial.'")
68 Id. at 575. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("I have observed previously that there is no 'philosophical or historical basis
for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than noncommercial
speech.' [quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)]. Indeed,
I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.")
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The dissenters took the position, with respect to the First
Amendment issue, that more proof was required. 69 They would
have given the government more of an opportunity to try to prove
its First Amendment case for the restriction on advertising and
billboards .70 As to the other restrictions, they went along with
them on the grounds that they were restrictions of business and
not restrictions of free speech. 7'
This is a case with interesting implications for state and
local government efforts to regulate tobacco and other tobacco
product advertising. The type of ban and zoning restrictions that
were an issue in the Massachusetts case are also prevalent in New
York City, Chicago, and in Los Angeles.72 Many of those
regulations will likely fall in cleanup litigation as a result of the
Court's decision in the Lorillard case.
This was the second victory for the First Amendment.
The third case I will be discussing in this area is Bartnicki
v. Vopper.73  This is one of the two cases with a surprisingly
liberal outcome. This is a case that pits freedom of the press
against privacy in a contemporary setting. The case involved an
illegal interception of cell phone conversations between two labor
union officials in Pennsylvania who were in the midst of a heated
labor dispute .74  "The suit involved the repeated intentional
69 Id. at 603. (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part):
While the ultimate question before us is one of law, the
answer to that question turns on complicated factual
questions relating to the practical effects of the regulations.
As the record does not reveal the answer to these disputed
questions of fact, the court should have denied summary
judgment to both parties and allowed the parties to present
further evidence.
70 Lorrilard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 603.
" Id at 604.
72 See Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d
100 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1066 (2000). See Federation of
Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago 189 F.3d 633
(7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1066 (2000).
7' 532 U.S. 514.
74 1d. at 518.
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disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone
conversation about a public issue. The persons who made the
disclosures did not participate in the interception, but they did
know - or at least had reason to know - that the interception was
unlawful." 75 They were talking about strategy, and some of the
talk became rough and tumble. In one instance they said that if
the school board and the superintendent did not start yielding to
their demands, they might have to bomb some front porches.
Somehow the cell phone conversation was intercepted. It got into
the hands of a local anti-tax activist, who then turned it over to
the local radio station, which played some of the excerpts of the
cell phone conversation.
76
This was a clear violation of federal and state statutes
passed in the late '60s and early '70s making unauthorized
wiretapping a criminal offense, and subjecting to civil damages
anyone who in an unauthorized way disclosed telephone
conversations, electronic communications, cell phone
conversations, or the like. 7  Consequently, the union people
whose private conversation was now public matter filed suit
under the damages sections of the federal and state statutes. They
were met, not surprisingly, with a First Amendment defense; that
freedom of the press privileged the radio station to report this
information despite the fact that doing so would violate the
federal and state statutes against disclosure.78
The lines were sharply drawn. The Supreme Court
decision, a six-to-three decision written by Justice John Paul
Stevens, agreed with the press and said that in these particular
75 id.
76Id. at 519.
77 Id. at 523; See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, entitled Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance.
71 Bartnicki, 523 U.S. at 520. The Court went on to state:
Respondents contended that they had not violated the statute
because (a) they had nothing to do with the interception, and
(b) in any event, their actions were not unlawful since the
conversation might have been intercepted inadvertently.
Moreover, even if they had violated the statute by disclosing
the intercepted conversation, respondents argued, those
disclosures were protected by the First Amendment.
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circumstances, imposing liability on the defendant would interfere
with First Amendment rights. The cell phone conversation was a
matter of public concern and the defendant, the radio station
employee, had not obtained the taped material illegally. 79 As
long as the person receiving the information did not have dirty
hands in the matter and as long as the information contained
matters of public concern, this would be the Court's standard.
The Court said that clearly. This conversation among people
involved in a contemporary and newsworthy labor dispute was a
matter of public concern and there was a First Amendment
freedom of the press privilege to report that information.80
A case that was important a generation ago, the Pentagon
Papers case, 8' involved newspapers' receiving stolen information
and then reporting the information they had received. The
government attempted to enjoin the publication of that
information. The case became a landmark decision in the
Supreme Court thirty years ago this year. The Supreme Court
ruled six-to-three that there could be no injunction or prior
restraint against publication of the material, even though the
material was probably stolen from the government, unless the
government could show grave and irreparable injury to the
national interest.82 It is remarkable how recurrent the theme of
that case is these days. In any event, since this was the civil side
of the coin it was not at all clear that precedent dictated the
outcome in Bartnicki. It was not clear from the Court's prior
decisions that just because the government could not enjoin
publication of secret material, once the material was published the
person who was victimized by the publication could not sue for
damages.8 3 After all, there have been a couple of cases where the
press was told it was no better than anyone else when it came to
obeying the law.84 The press also had to obey the law where
79 1d. at 521.
S0 Id. at 520.
81 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
82 Id. at 727.
83 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
8 Id. at 533. n. 19. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972)).
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confidential sources were concerned. 85 The press had to obey the
law where keeping its contractual promises were concerned. 86
One would have thought that the argument would have been the
same argument made by the plaintiff seeking damages, that the
press had to obey the law here, that the press was not above the
law. The Supreme Court majority asserted that the protection of
the First Amendment, freedom of the press and the values it
serves, includes permitting the press to inform the public about
important matters of public concern. Moreover, these statutes
also protect those concerns that trump the recognized and
compelling nature of the privacy interest.87
The concurring opinion in Bartnicki emphasized the fact
that the balance was very delicate. In Bartnicki, the press
received information without any fault on its part and the
information was of significant public concern.88 Of course, that
generic formula is subject to a good deal of manipulation in
particular cases. It would be interesting to see in the future
whether other kinds of matters that do not obviously seem to be
of public concern will be viewed as fair game for reporting, even
if the reporting is based on information obtained in violation of
people's constitutional or statutory rights. Today, there is great
concern about the privacy of cell phone, Internet, and E-mail
communications. What is the ultimate effect of this decision that
protects freedom of the press when the press reports information
despite an invasion of privacy, on the effort to balance freedom
of the press against and concerns of individual privacy? The
common theme in these cases is the Court's concern with the
First Amendment protection of the flow of information to the
public.
s Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
86 Id. See also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
87 Id. at 534.
88 Id. at 536-37.
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II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The next case, Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez,89
is the first of the three cases that are in the category of viewpoint
discrimination; government favoritism of one point of view over
another. The attorney for Velazquez deserves a pat on the back
for winning the case because in order to win he had to distinguish
a case decided by the Court ten years ago, Rust v. Sullivan,90
which seemed to many people to be exactly on point.
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with counsel for Velazquez that
Rust was distinguishable.
Legal Services involved funding legal service activities
and restrictions on such funding. 9' In 1996, as part of the
welfare reform package that went to Congress, restrictions were
imposed on the kinds of arguments legal services lawyers could
make in the context of representing welfare recipients in litigation
over welfare benefits. Although Legal Services funded lawyers
could argue that a particular client or plaintiff was entitled to a
particular benefit at issue, they could not argue the regulations
that restricted access to the benefits were unlawful, or
unconstitutional. Legal Services funded lawyers and their clients
challenged the restrictions imposed upon them.
The question in Legal Services was whether a restriction
on the use of public funds that limited the use of those funds to
making only certain arguments in court, was a violation of the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, with Justice Kennedy once again writing the majority
opinion, held that the restriction, even on publicly funded legal
services lawyers' activity, was a violation of the First
Amendment. 92  In order to reach that conclusion, the Court
89 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
90 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
91 Id. at 536. ("The restriction ... prohibits legal representation funded by
recipients of LSC moneys if the representation involves an effort to amend or
otherwise challenge existing welfare law." This restriction was imposed by
Congress when it enacted the Legal Services Corporation Act, 88 Stat. 378, 42
U.S.C. 2996).
92 Id. at 549.
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distinguished the well known case that was decided ten years ago,
Rust v. Sullivan.93
Rust v. Sullivan involved government restrictions on what
a government-funded doctor, working in a family planning clinic
subsidized by federal funds, could advise his or her patient about
the option of abortion as a method of family planning. 94 The
statute stated that no public funds could be used to support advice
concerning abortion.95 The Supreme Court upheld the restriction
in Rust in a five-to-four decision on the theory that "he who pays
the piper calls the tune." 96 The Court held that the government
was simply determining how it wanted its money spent, and the
institutions receiving that money were free to set up parallel
organizations funded with their own resources where a person
could be counseled about having an abortion. Therefore, there
was no First Amendment violation.
97
Many observers thought Rust and Legal Services
sounded alike, and therefore the same holding should apply. The
only difference in the two cases seemed to be the plaintiffs. Rust
involved doctors and Legal Services involved lawyers. This
difference was really important, however. There were two
elements in the Court's decision that struck down the restriction
on the use of public funds to advocate the unconstitutionality of
the public law. One reason the Court found a violation of the
First Amendment in Legal Services was because it applied the
traditional doctrine of viewpoint discrimination. 98 The Court saw
in this restriction, unlike the restriction on abortion counseling,
the government trying to silence a particular point of view, a
point of view about the unconstitutionality or legality of the
government's behavior. 99  This seems like a classic case of
censorship. The government was stifling the message that the
government was doing something bad. The Court in Legal
9' 500 U.S. 173.
9 Id. at 180.
9s Id. at 179.
96 Id. at 194.
9 Id. at 199.
98 Legal Services, 531 U.S. at 543.
HId. at 540.
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Services found the classic example of viewpoint discrimination.' 00
That was one distinction.
The other distinction between Legal Services and Rust was
that in Legal Services, the restriction on what the lawyer could
say, as distinct from restrictions on what the doctor could say,
undermined the ability of courts to do what they were supposed to
do. 1 1  The Court viewed this disparity as an assault on the
judiciary. 10 2 This restriction meant that a lawyer in court could
not help the court reach the proper result in a case because that
lawyer was barred or restrained from pointing out the legality or,
perhaps unconstitutionality, of a regulation that was directly
central to the issue before the court. 10 3 This second theme was
strongly supported by Justice Kennedy. According to Justice
Kennedy, there is not likely to be a broad application of this
decision to all kinds of government funding. But certainly,
funding that supports litigation is no longer subject to restrictions.
The dissenters in Legal Services reasoned there was no
abridgement as the issue was funding and not prohibition of
speech. The government was simply trying to define the kind of
program it wanted, as it did in Rust, and the government was
entitled to define the program it was funding.104 However, the
majority reasoned that the government was not paying someone to
give its message in this case. This was government supporting
the private speech of a lawyer who had been subsidized to
represent private clients. Therefore, the government had less
right to dictate the outcome of that speech. 105
One other final point to be made about the holding in
Legal Services is in terms of its implication for the future. The
area where there will be a good deal of litigation will have to do
with public funding for the arts. One example is the dispute over
"'00Id. at 547.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 546. ("The restriction imposed by the statute here threatens severe
impairment of the judicial function.")
''
3Legal Services, 531 U.S. at 546.
104 Id. at 554.
05 Id. at 542.
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the Brooklyn Museum and the termination of certain funding. 10 6
This case will cast a good deal of doubt on the actions under
review in that situation.
Similar to the reasoning of Legal Services is that of Good
News Club v. Milford. This case represents the reasoning "what's
good for the goose is good for the gander." In Legal Services, it
was the liberal justices who reasoned that a certain viewpoint was
being excluded, censored, picked on, and denigrated from the
forum or discussion. Now, the conservatives in Good News Club
made the same point and prevailed. 107 This case involved the use
of schoolroom facilities immediately after school by a group
called the "Good News Club." This club is a national Christian
youth group organization that holds after school programs in
several hundred schools across the country. 10 8  It is clear that
these after-school programs have a very strong religious
content. 109 Religion, is indeed, their purpose.
Many school boards, like the one in Milford,
rejected requests to use schoolrooms after hours for groups like
the Good News Club. This refusal was taken to court on the
ground that it was a violation of the Club's free speech right and
constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 110 The Club
alleged that the only reason for not letting it utilize the school's
facilities was because the point of view they were espousing with
the students was a religious point of view and that this is an
impermissible basis for exclusion.'' That was their argument,
and it was the argument the Court accepted. What the Court said
in Good News Club was that by permitting other non-student
groups to use school facilities after hours, the school board had
1o6Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York and Giuliani, 64
F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
107 Milford, 533 U.S. at 98.
108 Id. at 103.
109 Id.
110 Id.
.1. Id. (The Milford Board of Education adopted a resolution rejecting the
Club's request after their attorney reviewed the materials and activities of the
Club. The attorney found the activities were "the equivalent of religious
instruction itself").
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created a limited public forum. As long as someone wanted to
have meetings or conduct activities that were in keeping with the
nature of a public forum, and the purpose was within the uses to
which a public forum could be dedicated, the group could not be
excluded from those uses on the ground that their viewpoint was
religion. 112
In reaching the decision in Good News Club, the Court
relied very centrally on a case from the Long Island area, from
about ten years ago, known as the Lamb's Chapel1 3 case. In
Lambs Chapel, the Court held that the use of school facilities to
show a movie with a religious theme could not be barred when
other groups were allowed to show movies with other kinds of
themes after school hours."14 The Court said the same is true
there as in Good News Club. There could be no viewpoint
discrimination for groups that want to show movies, and no
viewpoint discrimination for groups that want to involve children
in their religious viewpoint discussions."5
There are a couple of important differences in these
two cases that the dissenters pointed out. It is one thing for an
adult group to show a movie with a religious theme. It is another
thing for a group that is involved with students to have a meeting
which is basically entirely religious. 116 The dissenters' position
in Good News Club was that this was not an impermissible
discrimination against protected points of view. The dissenters
reasoned that this was an understandable effort to protect the
schools against religious worship on school property. 117  The
school's interest in preventing religious worship from occurring
on school property is based partly on another section of the First
Amendment, the Establishment Clause." 8  The Establishment
112 Id. at 106.
'13 Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1973).
114 Id. at 394.
115 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107.
6d. at 143-44.
117 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
.18 Id. at 138.
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Clause warrants that the government shall not favor religion." 9
The dissenters in Good News Club were very concerned that a
setting which allowed a classroom to be used immediately after
school by young children, which was supervised by off-campus
adults with a religious point of view, might increase the potential
of violating the Establishment Clause.1 20 That was the essence of
the dissent by Justices Stevens, 21 David H. Souter, and
Ginsburg. 122
It is quite possible that the Court's six-to-three decision,
with Justice Thomas writing the opinion that permits the use of
school property in this fashion, is going to have some significant
spillover effect on some of the other battles that are raging over
the proper accommodation between religion and the public
schools. It is not possible that the cases banning school prayer
are in jeopardy, but certainly other kinds of religious activity on
school premises, that are less overt than school prayer 23 or the
posting of the Ten Commandments,1 24 may have stronger
arguments on their behalf made as a result of this case.
The other significant aspect of the case, which is one of
the central themes throughout the Court's church/state/school
premise jurisprudence, has been that public schools, grammar
schools, and high schools are different because of the presence of
children. This is because children are more vulnerable to
indoctrination and therefore these institutions have to be on guard
to keep religious influences off campus and away from children
as much as possible. However, here is a case where the religious
activity was allowed on campus and involved children. The
119 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
120 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 128-45.
121 Id. at 130. (Stevens, ., dissenting).
122 Id. at 134.. (Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123 See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding it
unconstitutional for clergy to come into classrooms); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, (1962) (New York Board of Regents prayer declared unconstitutional);
Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(mandatory Bible readings held unconstitutional).
124 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding it unconstitutional to
post the Ten Commandments in classrooms).
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Court's six-to-three decision held that this type of religious
activity was privileged under the First Amendment. 125 That does
not bode well for those that want to keep schools from having
more and more religious activity or involvement going on in
them.
So, there was victory for First Amendment claimants to be
sure. Perhaps this is a caution for the future in terms of the
delicate balance between free speech and religious freedom on the
one hand and not wanting the government to support religion, or
establish religion on the other hand.
The next case to be scrutinized is one in which the Court
had no trouble. This was one of the two unanimous cases, a case
called Cook v. Gralike.126 It is one more case that addresses the
ongoing battle of term limits. You may recall that a few years
ago the Supreme Court held that state efforts to dictate term limits
for members of Congress violated federal rights under the
Federal Constitution. 127 The 'term limits' movement, in its
attempt to place term limits on members of Congress, was dealt a
significant blow by that decision. This is the sequel.
The 'term limits' proponents asserted that if they could
not force term limits on Congress, they would do the next best
thing, force Congressional candidates to take a position about
whether they support an amendment to the Constitution to permit
term limits. Further, they hoped to place these candidates'
positions on the ballot next to their respective names, a kind of
scarlet letter. 28  This was challenged on two grounds. One
ground was that this action was beyond the power of the states to
regulate the manner of federal elections. 129 Of course the states
have authority to regulate elections: when to vote and where to
vote and the like, even if there is a federal election. However,
the Court said that broad state power over election regulation
does not include the power to try to dictate who is going to win
125 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120.
'26 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
127 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thrornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
128 Cook, 531 U.S. at 525.
'
29 Id. at 521-22.
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by attaching an unfavorable label to a person who takes one
position and a favorable label on the person who takes the other
position. 130
The concurring Justices were explicit in articulating their
decisions, unlike the majority, with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
concurrence based on the First Amendment.13' They said the
government was penalizing the candidates who were not in favor
of term limits because of their point of view.132 According to the
concurring Justices, this was basically punishment for a point of
view and it was impermissible. Whatever the justification, the
unanimous decision was that it was impermissible for states to put
a scarlet letter next to the name of the person who refused to take
the state's position.1 33 This was a very fine example of the Court
being sensitive to efforts by the government to put its thumb on
the scale and to try to dictate one outcome rather than another.
III. FAILED FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS
In the final two cases I will discuss today, the First
Amendment claims failed. One case unanimously failed and the
other case was a sharply divided five-to-four decision.
The unanimous case was Shaw v. Murphy. 134 The case is
a continuation of the Court's very restricted attitude towards
prison rights litigation and prison rights generally. Here too,
there has been a sea of change in the past generation. A
generation ago the courts, under the guidance of the liberal
Warren court, 135 tended to be receptive to prisoner rights claims
of one kind or another. 136  Now the current Court is less
receptive.
In Shaw v. Murphy, there was a First Amendment claim
by a prisoner regarding restrictions on and punishment for
130 Id. at 525.
131 Id. at 530-32. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
132 id.
133 Id. at 527.
134 Shaw, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
135 Named for former Chief Justice Earl Warren.
136 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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internal prison correspondence. A few years ago the Court
indicated in a case called Turner v. Safley, 137 that such claims
would be judged by the most deferential form of balancing tests,
which are very favorable to the prison authorities, and very
hostile to the prisoners.1 38 The question here was should you
nonetheless permit the prisoner a slightly heightened First
Amendment scrutiny where the content of the correspondence has
some First Amendment protection.' 39 Namely, in this instance,
one prisoner was advising another prisoner how to defend himself
in a prison disciplinary suit; a form of inmate legal advice. 40
The question was whether such correspondence should be given a
slightly greater protection and requires slightly more scrutiny of
the justifications given to try to restrict that correspondence. The
Court's unanimous answer was no.141
The Court basically said that permitting heightened
scrutiny in this situation would open up a can of worms because
if it did, the nature of the content of prison correspondence would
lead to the use of different formulas and tests to measure the
propriety of restricting that content. If the Court allowed a
slightly heightened review for legal assistance mail, what about
religious theory mail or political communications mail? The
Court reasoned it would be imposing a great deal of extra burden
on prison authorities and judicial authorities without a great deal
of payoff for the prisoners. 42  So, once again, there was a
unanimous decision written by Justice Thomas. The Court
rejected the First Amendment claim. 143
The final case is the campaign finance case, Federal
Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
'7482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 87.
"9 Shaw, 532 U.S. at 227. (The decision below in the Ninth Circuit based its
analysis on the proposition that "inmates have a First Amendment right to
assist other inmates with their legal claims").
'40Id. at 225.
141'Id. at 231.
142 id.
141 Id. at 232.
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Committee,144 where a much more sharply contested court, in a
five-to-four decision, rejected the First Amendment claim of the
Colorado Republican Party. In the interest of full disclosure, it
should be indicated that the author is not neutral on these
particular issues. I worked on a brief on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union 145 in this case, in favor of the side that lost,
the Republican side. The case involved Supreme Court law going
back to a well-known case called Buckley v. Valeo, 14' which
involved a challenge to the federal campaign financing laws
enacted after Watergate.147 I was one of the lawyers involved in
the challenge to those laws, so the reader is going to get a brief,
but not a necessarily unbiased presentation on the issue.
According to the Court, the issue was whether restrictions
on campaign expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny because
they directly restrict speech since they restrict spending money to
get your message out, but restrictions on contributions to
politicians are subject to lesser scrutiny because they are lesser or
secondary speech since they are giving someone else the ability to
speak. There is also a concern with corruption when you make a
contribution to someone else. 148 Normally an expenditure for a
candidate made in consultation with him or her is viewed as an
overt contribution to that candidate. Otherwise, there would be a
way to circumvent contribution limits. You could call up your
friend, the candidate, and say how much advertising do you need
and where do you want it placed. I will take care of it. The
court has said that is really a contribution. This has been
accepted for a long time. 14
9
This case falls in the middle because the expenditures by
political parties were made in consultation with their candidates.
Therefore, the question is what about when the party is doing the
spending, when it uses party contributions to send messages that
44 533 U.S. 431.
145 Brief Amicus Curiae (#00-191).
146 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
147 Id. at 6.
141 Id. at 45.
149 Id.
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may be of direct benefit to the candidate?5 ° The reason that it is
a bit of a concern is that parties, unlike candidates who can only
receive $1,000 from each contributor, can receive up to $20,000
per contributor in the course of a year. The concern was if the
parties take the bigger checks and then run advertising that
benefits candidates, is this going to be a way to circumvent the
$1,000 limit on individuals who contribute to the candidate? The
majority's answer was yes, it is. 151
There is concern about the circumvention problem, and
therefore, even though the party is spending money it has raised,
independent of the candidate, and even though the party is
spending money for messages that may or may not be directly
linked to the candidate, as long as the candidate has some
involvement in the party's spending, then according to the
majority, it is as if the candidate is spending the money and
anybody who contributes to it can be subject to various kinds of
limitations. 152 The Republican Party argued that parties are
different than other speakers because their relationship with
candidates is so joined at the hip. The Republican Party asserted
that if there was limited ability to support its candidates, that
would be more of a First Amendment invasion than if a limit
were imposed on some third person's ability to support the
candidate. 53 The Court essentially rejected that argument and
said parties have no greater rights in this area than individuals or
associations; they probably do not have any lesser rights but they
do not have any greater rights. 54 Therefore, because of the
concern of circumventing contribution limits on money given
directly to a candidate's party, spending that is coordinated with
candidates has to be subject to the same kind of restraint.
Justice Souter wrote the decision. He was joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Stevens. The swing Justice in this
case was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who left the conservative
"0 FEC, 121 S. Ct. at 2357.51 Id. at 2371.
152 id.
... Id. at 2361.
154 Id. at 444 n.6.
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side with which she is normally aligned, and joined the Justices
who were in favor of upholding this restriction. The dissenters,
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
took the position that parties are different, and that the concerns
about undue influence on contributions to parties can be dealt
with in less restrictive ways than by restricting the ability of
parties to support the candidates that subscribe to their agenda.1 55
This was a victory for the campaign finances reform
forces, and a defeat for the campaign finance less restrictive
forces. It should be pointed out that this case did not involve
so-called soft money contributions to parties. Soft money
contributions to parties do not come under the normal regulations
of the campaign funding laws. They can be made by unions, or
by corporations, neither of which can give to candidates directly,
and they can be made by individuals in rather large amounts.
Soft money contributions do not go for things that directly
support candidates; they go for things that support parties. The
question in this area will be whether the so called McCain-
Feingold legislation will be put on the front burner after
September 1 1"t. 156 Moreover, will laws be passed to regulate that
kind of campaign financing by political parties, and how will the
court view those issues? Will they view them as predominantly
raising concerns of undue influence and corruption or will they
view them as being impermissible restrictions on the rights of
parties and others to engage in core First Amendment activity?
The answers to those questions will not be known until laws like
McCain-Feingold are passed; which may or may not occur. 157
1s5 Id. at 489.
156 S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). (The McCain-Feingold bill is also known as
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001).
157 The bill was passed and became law in March, 2002. Lawsuits
challenging the Act's constitutionality were filed the same day.
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IV. CONCLUSION: PREVIEW OF NEXT TERM
Just to finish with a brief preview of what you will see
this coming year. The Court has granted review in four cases
that will raise interesting First Amendment issues; two cases
involve pornography and children and the Internet. One of them
involves a question of the proper community standards by which
to judge pornographic material in this day and age where the
community is global. In other words, how can we transplant the
old notion of community standards to judge pornography in our
global Internet community?' 58 The other Internet issue has to do
with virtual pornography.1 59  If you create virtual electronic
pictures of children engaged in sexual activity, but you have not
exploited any real children to do so, can you be prosecuted under
child pornography restrictions on the Internet? So we will see the
answer to those two questions. As to the other two cases, one
involves pornography, namely: How much evidence of harm
caused by businesses that engage in sexually-oriented activity has
to be shown before communities can regulate those businesses
under their zoning laws? 60 Finally, the fourth case does not deal
with sex, but rather park permits and judicial review, and what
kind of requirements can be imposed on local officials who want
to censor access to public places like the park.' 6' It should be an
interesting season for the First Amendment.
158 American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000),
cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (No. 00-1293) (renamed Ashcroft v.
American Civil Liberties Union), argued on November 28, 2001.159 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted (2001) (No. 00-795) (renamed Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition),
argued on October 30, 2001.
160 Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1223 (2001) (No. 00-799), argued on
December 4, 2001.
161 Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 227 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2191 (2001) (No. 00-1249), aff'd by 122 S. Ct. 775
(2002).
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